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| fixed length control field |
01392pab a2200157 454500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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180718b2016 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
James, Oliver et al |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
The politics of agency death: ministers and the survival of government agencies in a parliamentary system |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. |
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| Date of publication, distribution, etc. |
2016 |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
p.763-784. |
| 362 ## - DATES OF PUBLICATION AND/OR SEQUENTIAL DESIGNATION |
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| Dates of publication and/or sequential designation |
Oct |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc. |
This article extends the theory of government agency survival from separation of powers to parliamentary government systems. It evaluates expectations of increased risk to agencies following transitions in government, prime minister or departmental minister, and from incongruence between the originally establishing and currently overseeing political executive. Using survival models for UK executive agencies between 1989 and 2012, the study finds that politics trumps performance. Ministers seek to make their mark by terminating agencies created by previous ministers, which is reinforced by high media attention to the agency. Performance against agency targets is not associated with higher termination risk, and replacement agencies do not perform any better than those that were terminated. Financial autonomy provides some protection for agencies that are less dependent on budgetary appropriations. - Reproduced. |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
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| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Politics and government |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
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| Main entry heading |
British Journal of Political Science |
| 909 ## - |
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| -- |
112661 |
