| 000 -LEADER |
| fixed length control field |
01007pab a2200157 454500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
| fixed length control field |
180718b1997 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
| Personal name |
Banerjee, Abhijit V. |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
| Title |
A theory of misgovernance |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. |
1997 |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
| Extent |
p.1289-1332 |
| 362 ## - DATES OF PUBLICATION AND/OR SEQUENTIAL DESIGNATION |
| Dates of publication and/or sequential designation |
Nov |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
| Summary, etc. |
This paper tries to explain why government bureaucracies are often associated with red tape, corruption, and lack of incentives. The paper identifies two specific ingredients that together can provide an explanation: the fact that governments often act precisely in situations where markets fail and the presence of agency problems within the government. We show that these problems are exacerbated at low levels of development and in bureaucracies dealing with poor people. We also argue that we need to posit the existence of a welfare-oriented constituency within the government in order to explain red tape and corruption - Reproduced |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Bureaucracy |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
| Main entry heading |
Quarterly Journal of Economics |
| 909 ## - |
| -- |
36566 |