Social norms and economic incentives in the welfare state (Record no. 41164)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01032pab a2200181 454500
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 180718b1999 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Lindbeck, Assar
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Social norms and economic incentives in the welfare state
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Date of publication, distribution, etc. 1999
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent p.1-35
362 ## - DATES OF PUBLICATION AND/OR SEQUENTIAL DESIGNATION
Dates of publication and/or sequential designation Feb
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. This paper analyzes the interplay between social norms and economic incentives in the context of work decisions in the modern welfare state. We assume that to live off one's own work is a social norm, and that the larger the population share adhering to this norm, the more intensely it is felt by the individual. Individuals face two choices: one economic, whether to work or live off public transfers; and one political, how large the transfer should be. The size of the transfer and the intensity of the social norm are determined endogenously in equilibrium. - Reproduced
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Social policy
700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Weibull, Jorgen W.
700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Nyberg, Sten
773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Main entry heading Quarterly Journal of Economics
909 ## -
-- 41164
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        Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2018-07-19 Volume no: 114, Issue no: 1 AR41540 2018-07-19 2018-07-19 Articles

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