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01127pab a2200157 454500 |
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180718b2000 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
Benabou, Roland |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
Unequal societies: income distribution and the social contract |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. |
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| Date of publication, distribution, etc. |
2000 |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
p.96-129 |
| 362 ## - DATES OF PUBLICATION AND/OR SEQUENTIAL DESIGNATION |
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| Dates of publication and/or sequential designation |
Mar |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc. |
This paper develops a theory of inequality and the social contract aiming to explain how countries with similar economic and political "fundamentals" can sustain such different systems of social insurance, fiscal redistribution, and education finance as those of the United States and Western Europe. With imperfect credit and insurance markets some redistributive policies can improve ex ante welfare, and this implies that their political support tends to decrease with inequality. Conversely, with credit constraints, lower redistribution translates into more persistent inequality; hence the potential for multiple steady states, with mutually reinforcing high inequality and low redistribution, or vice versa. - Reproduced |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
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| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Income distribution |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
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| Main entry heading |
American Economic Review |
| 909 ## - |
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| -- |
44583 |
