| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
01333pab a2200157 454500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
180718b2001 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Nixon, David C. |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Appointment delay for vacancies on the Federal Communications Commission |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. |
|---|
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. |
2001 |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
|---|
| Extent |
p.483-92 |
| 362 ## - DATES OF PUBLICATION AND/OR SEQUENTIAL DESIGNATION |
|---|
| Dates of publication and/or sequential designation |
Jul-Aug |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc. |
Confirmation politics for judicial appointees is an exhaustively studied phenomenon, but the politics of appointment for independent agencies is less well understood, because nominees are very rarely rejected and the Senate fails even to hold a recorded vote for most appointees. However, alternative evidence of conflict between the president and the Senate is available: the length of time it takes to fill a vacancy on a board or commission. An empirical assessment of FCC vacancies, based on an exponential regression model of vacancy duration, demonstrates that statutory restrictions on the partisanship of the board significantly deteriorate the efficiency of the appointment process. In addition, the appointment of minorities (though not of women) occurs only after unusually drawn-out appointments. A straightforward test of whether divided government leads to extended vacancies turns up negative. - Reproduced |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Judiciary |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
|---|
| Main entry heading |
Public Administration Review |
| 909 ## - |
|---|
| -- |
49752 |
