How do sanctions affect incumbent electoral performance? (Record no. 513701)

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fixed length control field 01650nam a2200145 4500
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100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Park, Brandon Beomseob
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title How do sanctions affect incumbent electoral performance?
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Name of publisher, distributor, etc Political Research Quarterly
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 72(3), Sep, 2019: p.744-759.
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc How do sanctions affect incumbent electoral performance during elections? Although existing literature suggests that sanctions may shorten or prolong incumbent tenure, we are less informed about their role in incumbent electoral fortunes. This research argues that sanctions hurt incumbents’ vote shares because citizens are more likely to hold their elected officials accountable for sanction-induced economic hardships and political instabilities. It also argues that the electoral punishment is pronounced in less democratic countries because sanctions, together with elections, significantly limit dictator’s co-optation strategy and open a greater window of opportunity for once repressed opposition groups in a repressive regime. Using 381 multiparty elections in seventy-nine countries between 1972 and 2012, this research finds that sanctions deteriorate the incumbent electoral performance, and they do so for autocratic leaders more than the democratic leaders. This study has important implications about the potential accountability in autocracies, the timing of sanctions imposition, the role of oppositions’ mobilization, and broadly speaking, the role of sanctions in democratization. - Reproduced.
773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Main entry heading Political Research Quarterly
906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN)
Subject DIP ELECTIONS
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Source of classification or shelving scheme
Item type Articles
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Permanent location Current location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Barcode Date last seen Koha item type
          Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2020-04-05 72(3), Sep, 2019: p.744-759. AR122858 2020-04-05 Articles

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