| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
01437nam a22001577a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
201012b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Agarwal, Sumit, Gene Amromin, Itzhak Ben-David and Douglas D. Evanoff |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Financial education versus costly counseling: how to dissuade borrowers from choosing risky mortgages? |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
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| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
12(1), Feb, 2020: p. 1-32 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc |
This paper explores the effects of mandatory third-party review of mortgage contracts on consumer choice. The study is based on a legislative pilot carried out in Illinois in 2006, under which mortgage counseling was triggered by applicant credit scores or by their choice of "risky mortgages." Low-credit score applicants for whom counselor review was mandatory did not materially alter their contract choice. Conversely, higher credit score applicants who could avoid counseling by choosing nonrisky mortgages did so, decreasing their propensity for high-risk contracts between 10 and 40 percent. In the event, one of the key goals of the legislation—curtailment of high-risk mortgage products—was only achieved among the population that was not counseled. - Reproduced |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Household Saving, Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages |
| 9 (RLIN) |
18522 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
|---|
| Main entry heading |
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
|---|
| Subject DIP |
PERSONAL FINANCE |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
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| Item type |
Articles |
