| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
01236nam a22001577a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
201014b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
Sanktjohanser, Anna |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
Endogenous monitoring in a partnership game |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
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| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
The American Economic Review |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
110(3), Mar, 2020: p.776-796 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc |
I consider a repeated game in which, due to imperfect monitoring, no collusion can be sustained. I add a self-interested monitor who commits to obtain private signals of firms' actions and sends a public message. The monitor makes an offer specifying the precision of the signals obtained and the amount to be paid in return. First, with a low monitoring cost, collusive equilibria exist. Second, collusive equilibria are monitor-preferred. Third, in monitor-preferred equilibria, firms' payoffs are decreasing in the discount factor. My model helps explain cartel agreements between self-interested parties and firms in legal industries in the United States and Europe. – Reproduced |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
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| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Market structure, Pricing, Monopolization strategies, Stochastic and dynamic games, Evolutionary games, Repeated games |
| 9 (RLIN) |
18648 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
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| Main entry heading |
The American Economic Review |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
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| Subject DIP |
MONOPOLY |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
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| Item type |
Articles |
