| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
01371nam a22001577a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
201014b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
Daley, Brendan and Green, Brett |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
Bargaining and news |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
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| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
The American Economic Review |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
110(2), Feb, 2020: p.428-474 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc |
We study a bargaining model in which a buyer makes frequent offers to a privately informed seller, while gradually learning about the seller's type from "news." We show that the buyer's ability to leverage this information to extract more surplus from the seller is remarkably limited. In fact, the buyer gains nothing from the ability to negotiate a better price despite the fact that a negotiation must take place in equilibrium. During the negotiation, the buyer engages in a form of costly "experimentation" by making offers that are sure to earn her negative payoffs if accepted, but speed up learning and improve her continuation payoff if rejected. We investigate the effects of market power by comparing our results to a setting with competitive buyers. Both efficiency and the seller's payoff can decrease by introducing competition among buyers. – Reproduced
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| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
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| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Matching Theory, Information and Knowledge, Communication |
| 9 (RLIN) |
18630 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
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| Main entry heading |
The American Economic Review |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
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| Subject DIP |
BARGAINING THEORY |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
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| Item type |
Articles |
