Donors’ Responses to profit Incentives in the social sector: The entrepreneurial orientation reward and the profit penalty (Record no. 514418)

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fixed length control field 02058nam a22001577a 4500
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fixed length control field 201031b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
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Personal name Faulk, Lewis, et al
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Title Donors’ Responses to profit Incentives in the social sector: The entrepreneurial orientation reward and the profit penalty
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
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Extent 39(1), Winter, 2020: p.218-242
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Summary, etc This study uses an online survey experiment to test whether the pairing of profit‐seeking with mission‐related programs in the social sector attracts or deters donations from individual donors. We test individuals’ response to three types of profit incentives allowed under current U.S. public policy: (1) non‐distributed profit to an organization, which is allowed for nonprofit entities; (2) profit to the organization's equity investors and owners, which is allowed under for‐profit social enterprise governance charters; and (3) profit to lending investors, which is introduced by social impact bonds, a pay‐for‐success policy tool. We test trust theory, under which profit incentives deter donors against entrepreneurial orientation (EO) theory, which suggests that donors are attracted to organizations that use innovative, market‐driven programs. Findings indicate support for both theories, but the support depends on how the specific profit incentive is structured. Donors support organizations that use profit‐generating social enterprise programs—but only when the profits are non‐distributable; donors’ support is significantly lower for social enterprises in which owners and equity investors may profit. Importantly however, this negative effect is not found for pay‐for‐success policy tools where lending investors, rather than equity investors and owners, receive profits.- Reproduced
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Topical term or geographic name as entry element Policy sciences - Periodicals, Political planning - United States
9 (RLIN) 20705
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Main entry heading Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
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Subject DIP UNITED STATES - SOCIAL POLICY
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Item type Articles
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Permanent location Current location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Barcode Date last seen Koha item type
          Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2020-10-31 39(1), Winter, 2020: p.218-242 AR123422 2020-10-31 Articles

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