| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
01119nam a22001457a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
201031b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
Waldman, Michael and Zax, Ori. |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
Promotion signaling and human capital investments |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
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| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
12(1), Feb, 2020: p.125-155 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc |
In a world characterized by asymmetric learning, promotions can serve as signals of worker ability, and this, in turn, can result in inefficient promotion decisions. If the labor market is competitive, the result will be practices that reduce this distortion. We explore how this logic affects human capital investment decisions. We show that, if commitment is possible, investments will be biased toward the accumulation of firm-specific human capital. We also consider what happens when commitment is not possible and show a number of results including that, if investment choices are not publicly observable, choices are frequently efficient.- Reproduced
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| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
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| Main entry heading |
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
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| Subject DIP |
HUMAN CAPITAL |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
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| Item type |
Articles |
