| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
01185nam a22001577a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
201102b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Halac, Marina and Kremer, Ltan |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Experimenting with career concerns |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
|---|
| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
|---|
| Extent |
12(1), Feb, 2020: p.260-288 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc |
A manager who learns privately about a project over time may want to delay quitting it if recognizing failure/lack of success hurts his reputation. In the banking industry, managers may want to roll over bad loans. How do distortions depend on expected project quality? What are the effects of releasing public information about quality? A key feature of banks is that managers learn about project quality from bad news, i.e., a default. We show that in such an environment, distortions tend to increase with expected quality and imperfect information about quality. Results differ if managers instead learn from good news.- Reproduced
|
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages |
| 9 (RLIN) |
20739 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
|---|
| Main entry heading |
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
|---|
| Subject DIP |
BANKING AND FINANCE |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Item type |
Articles |
