Price-linked subsidies and imperfect competition in health insurance (Record no. 514665)

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fixed length control field 01234nam a22001457a 4500
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 201126b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Jaffe, Sonia. and Shepard, Mark.
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Price-linked subsidies and imperfect competition in health insurance
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc American Economic Journal Economic Policy
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 12(3), Aug, 2020: p.279-311
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc Policymakers subsidizing health insurance often face uncertainty about future market prices. We study the implications of one policy response: linking subsidies to prices to target a given postsubsidy premium. We show that these price-linked subsidies weaken competition, raising prices for the government and/or consumers. However, price-linking also ties subsidies to health care cost shocks, which may be desirable. Evaluating this tradeoff empirically, using a model estimated with Massachusetts insurance exchange data, we find that price-linking increases prices 1–6 percent, and much more in less competitive markets. For cost uncertainty reasonable in a mature market, these losses outweigh the benefits of price-linking. – Reproduced
773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Main entry heading American Economic Journal Economic Policy
906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN)
Subject DIP HEALTH INSURANCE
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Item type Articles
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Permanent location Current location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Barcode Date last seen Koha item type
          Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2020-11-26 12(3), Aug, 2020: p.279-311 AR124147 2020-11-26 Articles

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