| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
01202nam a22001577a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
201130b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Heller, Yuval and Winter, Eyal. |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Biased-belief equilibrium |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
|---|
| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
American Economic Journal : Microeconomics |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
|---|
| Extent |
12(2), May, 2020: p.1-40 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc |
We investigate how distorted, yet structured, beliefs can persist in strategic situations. Specifically, we study two-player games in which each player is endowed with a biased-belief function that represents the discrepancy between a player's beliefs about the opponent's strategy and the actual strategy. Our equilibrium condition requires that (i) each player choose a best-response strategy to his distorted belief about the opponent's strategy, and (ii) the distortion functions form best responses to one another. We obtain sharp predictions and novel insights into the set of stable outcomes and their supporting stable biases in various classes of games. - Reproduced |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games |
| 9 (RLIN) |
21560 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
|---|
| Main entry heading |
American Economic Journal : Microeconomics |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
|---|
| Subject DIP |
DECISION MAKING |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Item type |
Articles |
