| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
01259nam a22001577a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
201130b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Eldar, Ofer and Magnolfi, Lorenzo. |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Regulatory competition and the market for corporate law |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
|---|
| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
American Economic Journal : Microeconomics |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
|---|
| Extent |
12(2), May, 2020: p.60-98 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc |
This article develops an empirical model of firms' choice of corporate laws under inertia. Delaware dominates the incorporation market, though recently Nevada, a state whose laws are highly protective of managers, has acquired a sizable market share. Using a database of firm incorporation decisions from 1995 to 2013, we show that most firms dislike protectionist laws, such as anti-takeover statutes and liability protections for officers, and that Nevada's rise is due to the preferences of small firms. Consistent with the bonding hypothesis, our estimates indicate that despite inertia, Delaware would lose significant market share and revenues if it adopted protectionist laws. - Reproduced |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests |
| 9 (RLIN) |
21568 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
|---|
| Main entry heading |
American Economic Journal : Microeconomics |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
|---|
| Subject DIP |
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Item type |
Articles |
