| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
01189nam a22001577a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
210122b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
Chen, Yanlin, and Zhang, Jun |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
Singalling by Bayesian persuasion and pricing strategy |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
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| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
The Economic Journal |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
130(628), May, 2020: p.976-1007 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc |
This article investigates how a privately informed seller could signal her type through Bayesian persuasion and pricing strategy. We find that it is generally impossible to achieve separation through one channel alone. Furthermore, the outcome that survives the intuitive criterion always exists and is unique. This outcome is separating, for which a closed-form solution is provided. The signalling concern forces the high-type seller to disclose inefficiently more information and charge a higher price, resulting in fewer sales and lower profit. Finally, we show that a regulation on minimal quality could potentially hurt social welfare, and private information hurts the seller. – Reproduced |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Bayesian persuasion, Pricing strategy |
| 9 (RLIN) |
23667 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
|---|
| Main entry heading |
The Economic Journal |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
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| Subject DIP |
PRICING STRATEGY |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
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| Item type |
Articles |
