| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
01242nam a22001577a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
210223b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Gagliarducci, Stefano and Manacorda, Marco |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Politics in the family: Nepotism and the hiring decisions of Italian firms |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
|---|
| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
|---|
| Extent |
12(2), Apr, 2020: p.67-95 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc |
This paper studies the effect of family connections to politicians on individuals' labor market outcomes. Using data for Italy spanning more than three decades on a sample of almost one million individuals plus data on the universe of individuals holding political office, we show that politicians extract significant rents, in terms of private sector jobs, for their family members. We present evidence consistent with the hypothesis that this phenomenon is a form of corruption, i.e., a quid pro quo exchange between firms and politicians, although arguably an inferior substitute for easier-to-detect modes of rent appropriation on the part of politicians. - Reproduced |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Nepotism, Family connections, Politics, Corruption |
| 9 (RLIN) |
25194 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
|---|
| Main entry heading |
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1 |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
|---|
| Subject DIP |
NEPOTISM |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Item type |
Articles |
