| 000 -LEADER |
| fixed length control field |
01516nam a22001577a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
| fixed length control field |
210705b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
| Personal name |
Sharma, Chanchal kumar and Swenden, Wilfred |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
| Title |
Economic governance: Does it make or break a dominant party equilibrium |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
International Political Science Review |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
| Extent |
41(3), Jun, 2020: p.451-465 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
| Summary, etc |
Why do voters re-elect the same party for prolonged periods of time even when there are reasonable alternatives available? When and why do they stop doing so? Based on a quantitative analysis of elections between 1972 and 2014, we test the significance of ‘economic governance’ for the continuance and fall of one-party dominance. With data from India we show that, under a command economy paradigm, a national incumbent party sustains its dominance by playing politics of patronage, but in a marketized economy, state governments gain considerable scope in managing their economic affairs. This enables different state parties to create a stable pattern of support in states. As state-level effects cease to aggregate at the national level, the party system fragments. However, such an aggregation can re-emerge if a single party consistently delivers in the states which it governs. – Reproduced |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Party system, India, Indian politics, Economic governance, Patronage politics, Federalism |
| 9 (RLIN) |
24639 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
| Main entry heading |
International Political Science Review |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
| Subject DIP |
ECONOMIC POLICY - INDIA |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
| Item type |
Articles |