Artificial Intelligence, algorithmic pricing, and collusion (Record no. 517268)

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fixed length control field 01132nam a22001457a 4500
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fixed length control field 210707b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Calvano, E. et al
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Artificial Intelligence, algorithmic pricing, and collusion
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc The American Economic Review
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 110(10), Oct, 2020: p.3267-3297
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc Increasingly, algorithms are supplanting human decision-makers in pricing goods and services. To analyze the possible consequences, we study experimentally the behavior of algorithms powered by Artificial Intelligence (Q-learning) in a workhorse oligopoly model of repeated price competition. We find that the algorithms consistently learn to charge supracompetitive prices, without communicating with one another. The high prices are sustained by collusive strategies with a finite phase of punishment followed by a gradual return to cooperation. This finding is robust to asymmetries in cost or demand, changes in the number of players, and various forms of uncertainty. – Reproduced
773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Main entry heading The American Economic Review
906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN)
Subject DIP ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
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Item type Articles
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Permanent location Current location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Barcode Date last seen Koha item type
          Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2021-07-07 110(10), Oct, 2020: p.3267-3297 AR124621 2021-07-07 Articles

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