Voter turnout with peer punishment (Record no. 517269)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 00968nam a22001457a 4500
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 210707b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Levine, David K. and Mattozzi, Andrea
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Voter turnout with peer punishment
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc The American Economic Review
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 110(10), Oct, 2020: p.3298-3314
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc We introduce a model where social norms of voting participation are strategically chosen by competing political parties and determine voters' turnout. Social norms must be enforced through costly peer monitoring and punishment. When the cost of enforcement of social norms is low, the larger party is always advantaged. Otherwise, in the spirit of Olson (1965), the smaller party may be advantaged. Our model shares features of the ethical voter model and it delivers novel and empirically relevant comparative statics results. – Reproduced
773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Main entry heading The American Economic Review
906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN)
Subject DIP ELECTION
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Item type Articles
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Permanent location Current location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Barcode Date last seen Koha item type
          Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2021-07-07 110(10), Oct, 2020: p.3298-3314 AR124622 2021-07-07 Articles

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