| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
01381nam a22001577a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
210710b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Armand, A., Coutts, A. and Vicente, P.C. |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Does information break the political resource curse: Experimental evidence from mozambique |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
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| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
The American Economic Review 1 |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
10(11), Nov, 2020: p.3431-3453 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc |
Natural resources can have a negative impact on the economy through corruption and civil conflict. This paper tests whether information can counteract this political resource curse. We implement a large-scale field experiment following the dissemination of information about a substantial natural gas discovery in Mozambique. We measure outcomes related to the behavior of citizens and local leaders through georeferenced conflict data, behavioral activities, lab-in-the-field experiments, and surveys. We find that information targeting citizens and their involvement in public deliberations increases local mobilization and decreases violence. By contrast, when information reaches only local leaders, it increases elite capture and rent-seeking. - Reproduced |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D74 Conflict; Conflict Resolution |
| 9 (RLIN) |
26431 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
|---|
| Main entry heading |
The American Economic Review |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
|---|
| Subject DIP |
POLITICAL PROCESSES |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
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| Item type |
Articles |
