| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
01084nam a22001457a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
210710b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
Basak, Deepal and Deb, Joyee |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
Gambling over public opinion |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
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| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
The American Economic Review |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
110(11), Nov, 2020: p.3492-3521 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc |
We consider bargaining environments in which public opinion provides leverage by making compromises costly. Two parties make initial demands, before knowing the public opinion. If deadlocked, they can bargain again after public opinion forms, but suffer reputation costs if they compromise, i.e., scale back their demands. We show that in equilibrium, parties may choose to make incompatible demands initially and gamble over public opinion even though one or both parties must bear a cost later. We characterize when deadlocks arise, and how this affects the welfare of the public in a representative two-party democracy compared to a direct democracy. - Reproduced |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
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| Main entry heading |
The American Economic Review |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
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| Subject DIP |
PUBLIC OPINION |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
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| Item type |
Articles |
