| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
01245nam a22001577a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
210722b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Dasgupta, Partha and Maskin, Eric |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Strategy-proofness, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and majority rule |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
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| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
The American Economic Review: Insights |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
2(4), Dec, 2020: p.459-474 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc |
We show that strategy-proofness, the Pareto principle, anonymity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and decisiveness uniquely characterize majority rule on any domain of preferences for which there exists a voting rule satisfying these axioms. In our formulation, strategy-proofness includes manipulations by coalitions. However, we demonstrate that the characterization still holds when coalitions are restricted to arbitrarily small size. We also show that when coalitions can manipulate outside the domain, there is an extension of majority rule that satisfies these axioms on any domain without Condorcet cycles. – Reproduced
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| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
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| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Political Processes, Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, Voting behavior |
| 9 (RLIN) |
27350 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
|---|
| Main entry heading |
The American Economic Review: Insights |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
|---|
| Subject DIP |
ELECTIONS |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
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| Item type |
Articles |
