| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
01241nam a22001577a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
210722b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
Sugaya, Takuo and Wolitzky, Alexander |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
A few bad apples spoil the barrel: An anti-folk theorem for anonymous repeated games with incomplete information |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
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| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
The American Economic Review |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
110(12), Dec, 2020: p.3817-3835 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc |
We study anonymous repeated games where players may be "commitment types" who always take the same action. We establish a stark anti-folk theorem: if the distribution of the number of commitment types satisfies a smoothness condition and the game has a "pairwise dominant" action, this action is almost always taken. This implies that cooperation is impossible in the repeated prisoner's dilemma with anonymous random matching. We also bound equilibrium payoffs for general games. Our bound implies that industry profits converge to zero in linear-demand Cournot oligopoly as the number of firms increases. – Reproduced |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
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| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Noncooperative Games C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games |
| 9 (RLIN) |
27368 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
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| Main entry heading |
The American Economic Review |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
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| Subject DIP |
GAMES THEORY |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
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| Item type |
Articles |
