Unemployment insurance taxes and labor demand: Quasi-experimental evidence from administrative Data (Record no. 517946)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01183nam a22001457a 4500
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 210806b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Johnston, Andrew C.
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Unemployment insurance taxes and labor demand: Quasi-experimental evidence from administrative Data
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 13(1), Feb, 2021: p.266-293
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc To finance unemployment insurance, states raise payroll tax rates on employers who engage in layoffs. Tax rates are, therefore, highest for firms after downturns, potentially hampering labor-market recovery. Using full-population, administrative records from Florida, I estimate the effect of these tax increases on firm behavior leveraging a regression kink design in the tax schedule. Tax hikes reduce hiring and employment substantially, with no effect on layoffs or wages. The results imply unanticipated costs of the financing regime which reduce the optimal benefit by a quarter and account for 12 percent of the unemployment in the wake of the Great Recession. – Reproduced
773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Main entry heading American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN)
Subject DIP EMPLOYMENT
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Item type Articles
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Permanent location Current location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Barcode Date last seen Koha item type
          Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2021-08-06 13(1), Feb, 2021: p.266-293 AR125168 2021-08-06 Articles

Powered by Koha