| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
01192nam a22001457a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
210806b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
Lemus, J., temnyalov, E. and Turner, J.L. |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
Liability insurance: Equilibrium contracts under monopoly and competition |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
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| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
13(1), Feb, 2021: p.83-115 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc |
In liability lawsuits (e.g., patent infringement), a plaintiff demands compensation from a defendant, and the parties often negotiate a settlement to avoid a costly trial. Liability insurance creates bargaining leverage for the defendant in this settlement negotiation. We study the characteristics of monopoly and equilibrium contracts in settings where this leverage effect is a substantial source of value for insurance. Our results show that under adverse selection, a monopolist offers at most two contracts, which underinsure low-risk types and may inefficiently induce high-risk types to litigate. In a competitive market, only a pooling equilibrium with underinsurance may exist. – Reproduced |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
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| Main entry heading |
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
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| Subject DIP |
INSURANCE |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
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| Item type |
Articles |
