| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
01213nam a22001577a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
210806b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Schummer, James Velez, Rodrigo A. |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Sequential preference revelation in incomplete information settings |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
|---|
| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
13(1), Feb, 2021: p.116-147 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc |
Strategy-proof allocation rules incentivize truthfulness in simultaneous move games, but real world mechanisms sometimes elicit preferences sequentially. Surprisingly, even when the underlying rule is strategy-proof and non-bossy, sequential elicitation can yield equilibria where agents have a strict incentive to be untruthful. This occurs only under incomplete information, when an agent anticipates that truthful reporting would signal false private information about others’ references. We provide conditions ruling out this phenomenon, guaranteeing all equilibrium outcomes to be welfare-equivalent to truthful ones.- Reproduced |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Strategy-proofness; Sequential mechanisms; Implementation; Market design |
| 9 (RLIN) |
28781 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
|---|
| Main entry heading |
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
|---|
| Subject DIP |
MARKET DESIGN |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Item type |
Articles |
