| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
01233nam a22001577a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
210927b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Bertelli, A.M., Mela, V. and Woodhouse, E.F. |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Corruption, democracy, and privately financed infrastructure |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
|---|
| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
Administration & Society |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
|---|
| Extent |
53(3), Mar, 2021: p.327-352 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc |
Do political institutions moderate the influence of corruption on privately financed infrastructure projects? We argue that electoral competition incentivizes politicians to monitor bureaucratic corruption and focus on the public benefits of projects. Without such incentives, corruption is not monitored and the private benefits of bribes and favorable contract terms are responsible for increasing numbers of projects. Studying 116 countries between 1984 and 2012, we find that as public-sector corruption increases in democracies, no change in the number of projects is observed, while more projects emerge in non-democracies as corruption worsens. – Reproduced |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Public–private partnerships, Infrastructure, Electoral competition, Bureaucratic corruption |
| 9 (RLIN) |
27685 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
|---|
| Main entry heading |
Administration & Society |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
|---|
| Subject DIP |
CORRUPTION |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Item type |
Articles |
