Fees, Reputation, and information production in the credit rating industry (Record no. 518501)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01132nam a22001577a 4500
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 210927b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Bizzotto, Jacopo and Vigier, Adrien
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Fees, Reputation, and information production in the credit rating industry
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc American Economic Journal Macroeconomics
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 13(2), May, 2021: p.1-34
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc We compare a credit rating agency's incentives to acquire costly information when it is only paid for giving favorable ratings to the corresponding incentives when the agency is paid up-front, i.e., irrespective of the ratings assigned. We show that, in the presence of moral hazard, contingent fees provide stronger dynamic incentives to acquire information than up-front fees and may induce higher social welfare. When the fee structure is chosen by the agency, contingent fees arise as an equilibrium outcome, in line with the way the market for credit rating actually works. – Reproduced
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Credit rating
9 (RLIN) 29571
773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Main entry heading American Economic Journal Macroeconomics
906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN)
Subject DIP FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRIES
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Item type Articles
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Permanent location Current location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Barcode Date last seen Koha item type
          Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2021-09-27 13(2), May, 2021: p.1-34 AR125638 2021-09-27 Articles

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