| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
01378nam a22001577a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
220127b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
Kincaid, Harold |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
Concrete ontology: Comments on Lauer, Little, and Lohse |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
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| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
Philosophy of the Social Sciences |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
51(1), Jan, 2021: p.40-47 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc |
I share with all the other authors the view that conceptual metaphysics without close ties to science is of minimal value, that this holds for much of current work on social ontology, and that if there is value in social ontology, it has to be in contributing to empirical social science. I do perhaps disagree with all three authors about making any blanket statements concerning either instrumentalism or realism about the social sciences and their ontologies. I argue and try to show instead that if there are fruitful questions of social ontology, they are probably mostly local empirical issues raised by specific pieces of social science. Certain kinds of pluralism and instrumentalism may well make sense in some situations. I illustrate with debates over the need for psychological realism and revealed preference theory in economics. – Reproduced |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
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| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Instrumentalism, Realism, Social ontology, Revealed preference theory |
| 9 (RLIN) |
29331 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
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| Main entry heading |
Philosophy of the Social Sciences |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
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| Subject DIP |
REALISM |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
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| Item type |
Articles |
