| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
01138nam a22001457a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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220217b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
Weaver, Jeffrey |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
Jobs for sale: Corruption and misallocation in hiring |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
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| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
The American Economic Review |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
111(10), Oct, 2021: p.3093-3122 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc |
Corrupt government hiring is common in developing countries. This paper uses original data to document the operation and consequences of corrupt hiring in a health bureaucracy. Hires pay bribes averaging 17 months of salary, but contrary to conventional wisdom, their observable quality is comparable to counterfactual merit-based hires. Exploiting variation across jobs, I show that the consequences of corrupt allocations depend on the correlation between wealth and quality among applicants: service delivery outcomes are good for jobs where this was positive and poor when negative. In this setting, the correlation was typically positive, leading to relatively good performance of hires. – Reproduced
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| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
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| Main entry heading |
The American Economic Review |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
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| Subject DIP |
EMPLOYMENT |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
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| Item type |
Articles |
