Household Search and the Marital Wage Premium (Record no. 519404)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01205nam a22001457a 4500
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 220311b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Pilossoph, Laura and Wee, Shu Lin
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Household Search and the Marital Wage Premium
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 13(4), Oct, 2021: p.55-109
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc We develop a model where selection into marriage and household search generate a marital wage premium. Beyond selection, married individuals earn higher wages for two reasons. First, income pooling within a joint household raises risk-averse individuals' reservation wages. Second, married individuals climb the job ladder faster, as they internalize that higher wages increase their partner's selectivity over offers. Specialization according to comparative advantage in search generates a premium that increases in spousal education, as in the data. Quantitatively, household search explains 10–33 percent and 20–58 percent of the premium for males and females, respectively, and accounts for its increase with spousal education. – Reproduced
773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Main entry heading American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics
906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN)
Subject DIP WAGES
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Item type Articles
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Permanent location Current location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Barcode Date last seen Koha item type
          Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2022-03-11 13(4), Oct, 2021: p.55-109 AR126321 2022-03-11 Articles

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