Consumer information and the limits to competition (Record no. 520321)

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fixed length control field 01205nam a22001457a 4500
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fixed length control field 220907b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Armstrong, Mark and Zhou, Jidong
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Consumer information and the limits to competition
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc American Economic Review
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 112(2), Feb, 2022: p.534-577
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc This paper studies competition between firms when consumers observe a private signal of their preferences over products. Within the class of signal structures that induce pure-strategy pricing equilibria, we derive signal structures that are optimal for firms and those that are optimal for consumers. The firm-optimal policy amplifies underlying product differentiation, thereby relaxing competition, while ensuring consumers purchase their preferred product, thereby maximizing total welfare. The consumer-optimal policy dampens differentiation, which intensifies competition, but induces some consumers to buy their less preferred product. Our analysis sheds light on the limits to competition when the information possessed by consumers can be designed flexibly.- Reproduced
773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Main entry heading American Economic Review
906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN)
Subject DIP CONSUMERS
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Item type Articles
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Permanent location Current location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Barcode Date last seen Koha item type
          Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2022-09-07 112(2), Feb, 2022: p.534-577 AR126925 2022-09-07 Articles

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