| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
01171nam a22001457a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
220912b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
Leive, Adam |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
Health insurance design meets saving incentives: Consumer responses to complex contracts |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
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| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
14(2), Apr, 2022: p.200-227 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc |
To lower health care costs, Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) offer tax incentives encouraging people to trade off current consumption against future consumption. This paper tests whether consumers use HSAs as self-insurance over the life cycle. Using administrative data from a large employer and a regression discontinuity design, I estimate the marginal propensity to consume from HSA assets is 0.85 and reject the neoclassical benchmark of 0. Comparisons with 401(k) saving show most employees do not treat HSA money as fungible with retirement savings. In this setting, HSAs did not reduce health spending and instead increased the share that was financed tax-free. –Reproduced |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
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| Main entry heading |
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
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| Subject DIP |
HEALTH INSURANCE |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
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| Item type |
Articles |
