A theory of crime and vigilance (Record no. 520710)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01117nam a22001577a 4500
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 221007b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Vásquez, Jorge
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title A theory of crime and vigilance
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 14(3), Aug, 2022: p.255-303
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc This paper develops a theory of crime in which potential victims elect their vigilance levels. When vigilance expenses are greater than expected property losses, an increase in penalties raises crime, namely, a criminal Laffer curve emerges. This curve is higher and peaks earlier when victims face higher costs. Thus, the government may wish to subsidize vigilance rather than increase penalties. Indeed, an increase in penalties may shift the vigilance levels further away from their socially optimal ones. Finally, the crime rate first rises and then falls in the property value at stake, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. – Reproduced
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Crime, Vigilance
9 (RLIN) 34808
773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Main entry heading American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN)
Subject DIP CRIMES
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Item type Articles
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Permanent location Current location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Barcode Date last seen Koha item type
          Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2022-10-07 14(3), Aug, 2022: p.255-303 AR127292 2022-10-07 Articles

Powered by Koha