Screening inattentive buyers (Record no. 521180)

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fixed length control field 01068nam a22001457a 4500
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fixed length control field 221226b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Mensch, Jeffrey
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Screening inattentive buyers
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc The American Economic Review
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 112(6), Jun, 2022: p.1949-1984
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc Information plays a crucial role in mechanism design problems. A potential complication is that buyers may be inattentive, and so their information may endogenously and flexibly depend on the offered mechanism. I show that it is without loss of generality to consider contour mechanisms, which comprise triplets of allocation probabilities, prices, and beliefs, and are uniquely determined by a single such point. The mechanism design problem then reduces to Bayesian persuasion along the optimal contour. This reduction has significant implications for both the implementation of the optimal mechanism and the revenues that can be achieved. – Reproduced
773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Main entry heading The American Economic Review
906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN)
Subject DIP INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Item type Articles
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Permanent location Current location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Barcode Date last seen Koha item type
          Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2022-12-26 112(6), Jun, 2022: p.1949-1984 AR127736 2022-12-26 Articles

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