| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
01225nam a22001577a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
230228b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
Fu, Qiang and Wu, Zenan |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
Disclosure and favoritism in sequential elimination contests |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
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| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
14(4), Nov, 2022: p.78-121 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc |
We consider a two-stage contest, in which only a subset of contestants enters the finale. We explore the optimal policy for disclosing contestants' interim status after the preliminary round, i.e., their interim ranking and elimination decision. The optimum depends on the design objective. We fully characterize the conditions under which disclosure or concealment emerges as the optimum. We further allow the organizer to bias the competition based on finalists' interim rankings, which endogenizes the dynamic structure of the contest. Concealment outperforms in generating total effort, while disclosure prevails when maximizing the expected winner's total effort. – Reproduced |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Noncooperative Games, Organization and Market Structure |
| 9 (RLIN) |
37775 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
|---|
| Main entry heading |
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
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| Subject DIP |
GAME THEORY |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
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| Item type |
Articles |
