Strategic formal layoffs: Unemployment insurance and informal labor markets (Record no. 522271)

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fixed length control field 01132nam a22001457a 4500
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 230328b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Doornik, B.V., Schoenherr, D. and Skrastins, J.
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Strategic formal layoffs: Unemployment insurance and informal labor markets
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 15(1), Jan, 2023: p.292-318
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc Exploiting an unemployment insurance reform in Brazil, we study incentive effects of UI in the presence of informal labor markets. We find that eligibility for UI benefits increases formal layoffs by 11 percent. Most of the additional layoffs are related to workers transitioning to informal employment. We further document formal layoff and recall patterns consistent with rent extraction from the UI system. Workers are laid off as they become eligible for UI benefits and recalled when benefits cease. These patterns are stronger for industries and municipalities with a high degree of labor market informality.- Reproduced
773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Main entry heading American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN)
Subject DIP EMPLOYMENT
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Item type Articles
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Permanent location Current location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Barcode Date last seen Koha item type
          Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2023-03-28 15(1), Jan, 2023: p.292-318 AR128495 2023-03-28 Articles

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