Signaling and discrimination in collaborative projects (Record no. 522290)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01206nam a22001457a 4500
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 230328b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Onuchic, Paula and Ray, Debraj
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Signaling and discrimination in collaborative projects
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc The American Economic Review
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 113(1), Jan, 2023: p.210-252
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc We study collaborative work in pairs when potential collaborators are motivated by the reputational implications of (joint or solo) projects. In equilibrium, individual collaboration strategies both influence and are influenced by the public assignment of credit for joint work across the two partners. We investigate the fragility of collaboration to small biases in the public's credit assignment. When collaborators are symmetric, symmetric equilibria are often fragile, and in nonfragile equilibria individuals receive asymmetric collaborative credit based on payoff-irrelevant "identities." We study payoff distributions across identities within asymmetric equilibria, and compare aggregate welfare across symmetric and asymmetric equilibria.- Reproduced
773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Main entry heading The American Economic Review
906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN)
Subject DIP COLLABORATIVE WORK
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Item type Articles
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Permanent location Current location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Barcode Date last seen Koha item type
          Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2023-03-28 113(1), Jan, 2023: p.210-252 AR128510 2023-03-28 Articles

Powered by Koha