| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
01210nam a22001457a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
230411b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
Covert, Thomas R. and Sweeney, Richard L. |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
Relinquishing riches: Auctions versus informal negotiations in Texas oil and gas leasing |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
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| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
The American: Economic Reviews |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
113(3), Mar, 2023: p. 628-663 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc |
This paper compares outcomes from informally negotiated oil and gas leases to those awarded via centralized auction. We focus on Texas, where legislative decisions in the early twentieth century assigned thousands of proximate parcels to different mineral allocation mechanisms. We show that during the fracking boom, which began unexpectedly decades later, auctioned leases generated at least 55 percent larger up-front payments and 40 percent more output than negotiated leases did. These results suggest large potential gains from employing centralized, formal mechanisms in markets that traditionally allocate in an unstructured fashion, including the broader $3 trillion market for privately owned minerals.- Reproduced |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
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| Main entry heading |
The American: Economic Reviews |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
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| Subject DIP |
ECONOMICS |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
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| Item type |
Articles |
