| 000 -LEADER |
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01144nam a22001457a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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230609b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
| Personal name |
Kashyap, Anil K. et al |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
| Title |
Is there too much benchmarking in asset management? |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
The American Economic Review |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
| Extent |
113(4), Apr, 2023: p.1112-1141 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
| Summary, etc |
We propose a tractable model of asset management in which benchmarking arises endogenously, and analyze its welfare consequences. Fund managers' portfolios are not contractible and they incur private costs in running them. Incentive contracts for fund managers create a pecuniary externality through their effect on asset prices. Benchmarking inflates asset prices and creates crowded trades. The crowding reduces the effectiveness of benchmarking in incentive contracts for others, which fund investors fail to account for. A social planner, recognizing the crowding, opts for contracts with less benchmarking and less incentive provision. The planner also delivers lower asset management costs.- Reproduced |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
| Main entry heading |
The American Economic Review |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
| Subject DIP |
ASSET MANAGEMENT |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
| Item type |
Articles |