| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
01214nam a22001457a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
230612b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
Altinoglu, Levent and Stiglitz, Joseph E. |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
Collective moral hazard and the interbank market |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
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| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
15(2), Apr, 2023: p.35-64 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc |
The concentration of risk within the financial system leads to systemic instability. We propose a theory to explain the structure of the financial system and show how it alters the risk-taking incentives of financial institutions when the government optimally intervenes during crises. By issuing interbank claims, risky institutions endogenously become large and interconnected. This concentrated structure enables institutions to share the risk of systemic crises in a privately optimal way but leads to excessive risk taking even by peripheral institutions. Interconnectedness and excessive risk taking reinforce one another. Macroprudential regulation that limits the interconnectedness of risky institutions improves welfare.- Reproduced |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
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| Main entry heading |
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
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| Subject DIP |
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
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| Item type |
Articles |
