Optimal income taxation with spillovers from employer learning (Record no. 523372)

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100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Craig, Ashley C.
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Optimal income taxation with spillovers from employer learning
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 15(2), May, 2023: p.82-125
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc Author study optimal income taxation when human capital investment is imperfectly observable by employers. In the model, Bayesian inference about worker productivity compresses the wage distribution, lowering the private return to human capital investment. An externality arises: given the same information, employers are more optimistic about each individual if workers are generally more productive. The significance of this externality hinges on the accuracy of employers' beliefs and the responsiveness of human capital. For the United States, taking it into account lowers optimal marginal tax rates for most workers, reducing them by a maximum of 9–13 percentage points between $50,000 and $100,000. – Reproduced
773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Main entry heading American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN)
Subject DIP TAXATION
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Item type Articles
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Permanent location Current location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Barcode Date last seen Koha item type
          Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2023-08-11 15(2), May, 2023: p.82-125 AR129338 2023-08-11 Articles

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