Does cash bail deter misconduct? (Record no. 523654)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01170nam a22001457a 4500
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 230915b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Ouss, Aurelie and Stevenson, Megan
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Does cash bail deter misconduct?
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc American Economic Journal: Applied Economies
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 15(3), Jul, 2023: p.150-182
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc Courts routinely use low cash bail as a financial incentive to ensure released defendants appear in court and abstain from crime. This can create burdens for defendants with little empirical evidence on its efficacy. We exploit a prosecutor-driven reform that led to a sharp reduction in low cash bail and pretrial supervision, with no effect on pretrial detention, to test whether such incentive mechanisms succeed at their intended purpose. We find no evidence that financial collateral has a deterrent effect on failure to appear or pretrial crime. This paper also contributes to the literature on legal actor discretion, showing that nonbinding reforms may have limited impact on jail populations.- Reproduced
773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Main entry heading American Economic Journal: Applied Economies
906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN)
Subject DIP CRIMINAL JUSTICE
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Item type Articles
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Permanent location Current location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Barcode Date last seen Koha item type
          Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2023-09-15 15(3), Jul, 2023: p.150-182 AR129560 2023-09-15 Articles

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