| 000 -LEADER |
| fixed length control field |
01170nam a22001457a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
| fixed length control field |
230915b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
| Personal name |
Ouss, Aurelie and Stevenson, Megan |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
| Title |
Does cash bail deter misconduct? |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
American Economic Journal: Applied Economies |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
| Extent |
15(3), Jul, 2023: p.150-182 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
| Summary, etc |
Courts routinely use low cash bail as a financial incentive to ensure released defendants appear in court and abstain from crime. This can create burdens for defendants with little empirical evidence on its efficacy. We exploit a prosecutor-driven reform that led to a sharp reduction in low cash bail and pretrial supervision, with no effect on pretrial detention, to test whether such incentive mechanisms succeed at their intended purpose. We find no evidence that financial collateral has a deterrent effect on failure to appear or pretrial crime. This paper also contributes to the literature on legal actor discretion, showing that nonbinding reforms may have limited impact on jail populations.- Reproduced |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
| Main entry heading |
American Economic Journal: Applied Economies |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
| Subject DIP |
CRIMINAL JUSTICE |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
| Item type |
Articles |