| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
01191nam a22001457a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
230918b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Gaynor, M., Mehta, N. and Shubik, S.R. |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Optimal contracting with altruistic agents: Medicare payments for dialysis drugs |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
|---|
| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
The American Economic Review |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
|---|
| Extent |
113(6), Jun, 2023: p.1530-1571 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc |
We study health-care provider agency and optimal payments, considering an expensive medication for dialysis patients. Using Medicare claims data we estimate a structural model of treatment decisions, in which providers differ in their altruism and marginal costs, and this heterogeneity is unobservable to the government. In a novel application of nonlinear pricing methods, we empirically characterize the optimal contracts in this environment. The optimal contracts eliminate medically excessive dosages and reduce expenditures, resulting in approximately $300 million in annual gains from better contracting. This approach could be applied to a broad class of problems in healthcare payment policy.- Reproduced |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
|---|
| Main entry heading |
The American Economic Review |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
|---|
| Subject DIP |
HEALTH SERVICES |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Item type |
Articles |
