Reputation and partial default (Record no. 523667)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01003nam a22001457a 4500
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 230918b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Amador, Manuel and Phelan, Christopher
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Reputation and partial default
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc The American Economic Review: Insights
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 5(2), Jun, 2023: p.158-172
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc This paper presents a continuous-time reputation model of sovereign debt allowing for both varying levels of partial default and full default. In it, a government can be a nonstrategic commitment type or a strategic opportunistic type, and a government's reputation is its equilibrium Bayesian posterior of being the commitment type. Our equilibrium has that for bond levels reachable by both types without defaulting, bigger partial defaults (or bigger haircuts for bond holders) imply higher interest rates for subsequent bond issuances, as in the data.- Reproduced
773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Main entry heading The American Economic Review: Insights
906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN)
Subject DIP DEBTS
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Item type Articles
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Permanent location Current location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Barcode Date last seen Koha item type
          Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2023-09-18 5(2), Jun, 2023: p.158-172 AR129573 2023-09-18 Articles

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