Political economy of elite capture and clientelism in public resource distribution: Theory and evidence from Baluchistan, Pakistan (Record no. 524175)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 02323nam a22001457a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 231031b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Ahmed, Manzoor |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Political economy of elite capture and clientelism in public resource distribution: Theory and evidence from Baluchistan, Pakistan |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc | India Quarterly |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION | |
| Extent | 79(2), Jun, 2023: p.223-243 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc | The article critically examines the presence of political and bureaucratic capture in public sector resource allocation in the province of Balochistan, Pakistan. The article applies robust empirical techniques to evaluate how the political and bureaucratic elite indiscriminately and disproportionally allocate public sector funds to meet two overarching ends: (a) to allow maximum misappropriation of public funds for their benefits and (b) to make constituency/district-specific allocations to buy political allegiance and promote pork barrel and patronage politics (political clientelism). For the empirical purpose, the article uses an unbalanced panel technique using data for districts from provincial-level sources. The empirical results show a strong capture and clientelism in the process of budget making and the allocations of resources/projects to districts/constituencies for incumbent politicians and senior career officials who are at the helm of affairs, making disproportionate budgetary allocations of public resources to their home districts or constituencies or the projects with much leverage of extraction (read bribes) in the process of project allocations, bidding and execution. The evidence suggests that districts, which are neither represented by the incumbency of provincial government nor by senior bureaucrats in ministries that make public policy, receive far lesser budgetary allocations than their proportionate share despite the prevailing poor social and economic landscape. Such capture suffices personal interests, supports clientelism in resource sharing and creates an inter-regional and inter-district/constituency disparity in terms of economic and social development within the province. – Reproduced https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/09749284231165115 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Main entry heading | India Quarterly |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) | |
| Subject DIP | POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT – PAKISTAN - BALUCHISTAN |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Item type | Articles |
| Withdrawn status | Lost status | Source of classification or shelving scheme | Damaged status | Not for loan | Permanent location | Current location | Date acquired | Serial Enumeration / chronology | Barcode | Date last seen | Koha item type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Indian Institute of Public Administration | Indian Institute of Public Administration | 2023-10-31 | 79(2), Jun, 2023: p.223-243 | AR130054 | 2023-10-31 | Articles |