Self-reported signaling (Record no. 524252)

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fixed length control field 01139nam a22001337a 4500
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fixed length control field 231107b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Jungbauer, Thomas and Waldman,Michael
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Self-reported signaling
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 15(3), Aug, 2023: p.78-117
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc In many real-world settings, an action that affects the value of a product or service is self-reported rather than publicly observable. We investigate self-reporting when self-reports serve as a signal of sender productivity. In our model, a sender chooses an action and then sends a message concerning the action to multiple receivers. Receivers then bid for the sender's service after deciding whether to audit the sender. We find that self-reporting can reverse the standard result in signaling models that there is overinvestment in the action and that the possibility of misrepresentation may in fact improve welfare given self-reported signaling.- Reproduced

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20210204

773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Main entry heading American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Item type Articles
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Permanent location Current location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Barcode Date last seen Koha item type
          Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2023-11-07 15(3), Aug, 2023: p.78-117 AR130129 2023-11-07 Articles

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