The dynamics of property rights in modern autocracies (Record no. 524255)

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fixed length control field 01242nam a22001457a 4500
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fixed length control field 231107b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Cao, Dan and Lagunoff, Roger
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title The dynamics of property rights in modern autocracies
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 15(3), Aug, 2023: p.305-353
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc We study a dynamic model of property appropriation in autocracies. To maintain the appearance of the rule of law, an autocrat reassigns property only when the reassignment is acceptable to all affected citizens. Nevertheless, the autocrat can appropriate public and private property by exploiting enforcement gaps. After an adjustment period, wealth shares of public property and the private property of out-groups decline. The model rationalizes the connection between wealth inequality and privatization in many autocracies. Calibrating to Russian and Chinese data, simulations to mid-twenty-first century display widening wealth gaps between elites and the populace. Anocracies mitigate this outcome.- Reproduced

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20210229
773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Main entry heading American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN)
Subject DIP PROPERTY RIGHTS
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Item type Articles
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Permanent location Current location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Barcode Date last seen Koha item type
          Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2023-11-07 15(3), Aug, 2023: p.305-353 AR130132 2023-11-07 Articles

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