Optimal insurance: Dual utility, random losses, and adverse selection (Record no. 525330)

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fixed length control field 01201nam a22001457a 4500
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fixed length control field 240222b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Gershkov, Alex et al
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Optimal insurance: Dual utility, random losses, and adverse selection
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc The American Economic Review
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 113(10), Oct, 2023: p.2581-2614
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc We study a generalization of the classical monopoly insurance problem under adverse selection (see Stiglitz 1977) where we allow for a random distribution of losses, possibly correlated with the agent's risk parameter that is private information. Our model explains patterns of observed customer behavior and predicts insurance contracts most often observed in practice: these consist of menus of several deductible-premium pairs or menus of insurance with coverage limits–premium pairs. A main departure from the classical insurance literature is obtained here by endowing the agents with risk-averse preferences that can be represented by a dual utility functional (Yaari 1987).- Reproduced

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20221247
773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Main entry heading The American Economic Review
906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN)
Subject DIP INSURANCE
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Item type Articles
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Permanent location Current location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Barcode Date last seen Koha item type
          Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2024-02-22 113(10), Oct, 2023: p.2581-2614 AR131128 2024-02-22 Articles

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